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Abstract
We focus on the optimal value for various information-theoretical tasks. There are several studies for the
asymptotic expansion for these optimal values up to the order
√
n or logn. However, these expansions have errors
of the order o(
√
n) or o(logn), which does not goes to zero asymptotically. To resolve this problem, we derive
the asymptotic expansion up to the constant order for upper and lower bounds of these optimal values. While the
expansions of upper and lower bonds do not match, they clarify the ranges of these optimal values, whose errors
go to zero asymptotically.
I. INTRODUCTION
Recently, second order analysis and finite-length analysis attract much attention [1], [2], [3], [4], [5],
[6]. However, there is a gap between these two analyses as follows. To see this difference, we focus on
secure random number generation when a partial information is leaked to the third party [7], [8]. It is very
useful to calculate the maximum size N εn of secure keys under the constraint that the secrecy measure is
less than ε when n outcomes are generated according to the independent and identical distribution of a
certain distribution. However, its calculation amount is extremely large so that we cannot calculate it in
a realistic time with a practical length n. Instead of this evaluation, in second order analysis, we derive
asymptotic expansion of logN εn up to the order
√
n as A1n + A2,ε
√
n + o(
√
n)(or O(logn)) [2], [3],
[5], [6], [9]. Hence, A1n + A2,ε
√
n can be regarded as an approximation of logN εn. However, since the
error behaves as o(
√
n)(or O(logn)), it is difficult to evaluate the error of this approximation. Hence,
even when we draw the graph of this approximation, it is not easy to identify the true value of logN εn
in the graph. In the third order analysis, we derive its asymptotic expansion up to the order log n like
A1n+A2,ε
√
n+A3 logn+O(1) [10], [11], [12], [13]. However, it is still difficult to evaluate the error of
the approximation because it behaves as an unknown constant. Instead of this evaluation, in finite-length
analysis, we derive upper and lower bounds of logN εn while tighter bounds are preferable. To derive the
second or third order asymptotics, we often derive upper and lower bounds, and make their asymptotic
expansion because it is quite difficult to directly derive the asymptotic expansion of logN εn. Indeed, if
upper and lower bounds match their asymptotic expansion up to the order
√
n or logn, one might consider
that the upper and lower bounds are useful. However, we cannot say that these bounds are useful if their
calculation amount is very large. As is pointed in [14, Table 1][15, Table 1], for their calculation, this
kinds of upper and lower bonds require the calculation of the cumulant distribution function of the the
independent and identical distribution of a certain distribution related to our task. If the distribution is
binary distribution, we can easily calculate the cumulant distribution function. Unfortunately, in the general
case, its calculation is very large.
In this paper, to resolve this problem, we propose the concept of semi-finite length analysis as follows.
First, we derive upper and lower bounds of logN εn. Then, we make their asymptotic expansion up to the
constant term like A1n + A2,ε
√
n + A3 logn + A4 + O(1/
√
n). In this case, the difference between the
approximation A1n+A2,ε
√
n+A3 log n+A4 and the true bound is guaranteed to converge to zero. Hence,
we can say that the absolute of the difference is smaller than 1 when n is sufficiently large. Thus, from
2these approximations of upper and lower bounds, we can estimate the range of the true value of logN εn.
Since the aim is the approximate calculation of the upper and lower bounds, their asymptotic expansions
do not necessarily need to match each other. But, if their first order coefficients do not match each other,
the upper and/or lower bounds are so loose that they are not useful. We call this type of analysis the
semi-finite length analysis for upper or lower bounds, which can be summarized as follows.
R1 We can calculate the asymptotic expansion up to the constant term of the upper bound like
A+1 n+ A
+
2,ε
√
n+ A+3 log n+ A
+
4 +O(1/
√
n).
R2 We can calculate the same type of expansion of the lower bound like A−1 n+A
−
2,ε
√
n+A−3 log n+
A−4 +O(1/
√
n).
R3 A+1 = A
−
1 .
This kind of problem has not been discussed except for the source coding without side information [1],
[16].
In this paper, we address this problem for secure random number generation. To tackle this problem,
using several useful existing results, we derive upper and lower bounds for logN εn of secure keys under
the constraint that the secrecy measure is less than ε when n outcomes are generated according to the
independent and identical distribution of a certain distribution. For their asymptotic expansion, we employ
Edgeworth expansion and strong large deviation, which were derived by Bahadur and Rao [17]. Indeed,
strong large deviation was employed for information theory in the papers [13], [18], [19]. While the
papers [13], [18], [19] employed saddle point approximation in addition to strong large deviation, in a
similar way to the papers [20], [21], [22], [23] in other topics, we directly use the formula for strong large
deviation to calculate higher order asymptotics so that we do not employ saddle point approximation.
The next target is channel coding, which has two famous finite-length bounds, the dependent test (DT)
bound [24, Remark 15][6] and the meta converse bound [25][26, Section 4.6][6]. To discuss channel
coding, using a similar derivation based on strong large deviation and Edgeworth expansion, we derive
semi-finite length expansion in the simple binary hypothesis testing with two frameworks, which are
related to the above two types of bounds. In fact, these two types of bounds can be used for source
coding with side information [27, Theorem 7]. Then, applying these expansions, we derive upper and
lower bounds for this setting in the sense of semi-finite length analysis. In the same way, we derive the
same types of upper and lower bounds for channel coding when we assume a symmetric condition for
channel, the conditional additive condition defined in [14, Section IV] because this assumption brings
simple derivation, which enables us to get an asymptotic expansion up to the constant order. Finally,
we proceed to wire-tap channel [28], [29], [30], [31]. In this model, as pointed in [32, Section V][33,
Section VIII][34, Conclusions], we combine the results of secure random number generation and channel
coding. Then, when the wire-tap channel is degraded and the channels to the legitimate receiver and the
eavesdropper are conditional additive, we derive the desired asymptotic expansion while the paper [35]
discusses the second order asymptotics for generic wire-tap channels.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section II, we summarize notations used in this paper.
Section III discusses secure random number generation. Next, Section IV treats simple binary hypothesis
testing. Section V treats fixed-length source coding. by sing the result of Section IV. Then, using the
result of Section IV, Section VI proceeds to channel coding. Applying the results of Sections III and
VI, Section VII addresses wire-tap channel coding. To show the asymptotic expansion given in Sections
III and IV, Section VIII prepares knowledge of strong large deviation and Edgeworth expansion. Using
these tools, Sections IX and X show the asymptotic expansion stated in Sections III and IV, respectively.
Section XI gives the conclusion.
II. PRELIMINARIES
To discuss higher order asymptotics, we need several information quantities. In this section, we prepare
notations used in this paper and prepare these information quantities.
A. Notations
For a set A, let P(A) be the set of all probability distribution on A. It is also convenient to introduce
the set P¯(A) of all sub-normalized non-negative functions. We denote the set of conditional distributions
3on B conditioned with A by P(B|A). Given a distribution PA ∈ P(A), a conditional distribution
PB|A ∈ P(B|A), we define the joint distribution PB|A × PA ∈ P(A × B) as PB|A × PA(b, a) :=
PB|A(b|a)PA(a). In particular, PB|A=a is defined as PB|A=a(b) := PB|A(b, a). When the conditional
distribution PB|A=a does not depend on a ∈ A, this notation expresses the product distribution. That
is, PE × PA is defined as PB × PA(b, a) := PB(b)PA(a). We define the distribution PB|A · PA ∈ P(B)
as PB|A × PA(b, a) :=
∑
a∈A PB|A(b|a)PA(a). Given PAB ∈ P(A × B), the marginal distribution PA is
defined as PA(a) :=
∑
b∈B PAB(a, b). Also, the normalized uniform distribution on A is denoted by UA.
We define the distribution P nA on An as P nA(a1, . . . , an) := PA(a1) · · ·PA(an). We define the conditional
distribution P nB|A on Bn conditioned with A as P nB|A(b1, . . . , bn|a1, . . . , an) := PB|A(b1|a1) · · ·PB|A(bn|an).
Further, EP and VP express the expectation and the variance under the distribution P ∈ P¯(A),
respectively, as follows.
EP [f(A)] :=
∑
a∈A
P (a)f(a), VP [f(A)] :=
∑
a∈A
P (a)(f(a)− EP [f(A)])2. (1)
B. Information quantity for first order asymptotics
Given two distributions P,Q ∈ P¯(A), the difference between two distributions are evaluated by the
variational distance defined by
d(P,Q) :=
1
2
∑
a∈A
|P (a)−Q(a)| = 1
2
EP
[∣∣∣1− Q
P
∣∣∣]. (2)
Also, we use the relative entropy D(P‖Q) and the entropy H(P )
D(P‖Q) := EP
[
log
P
Q
]
, H(P ) := −EP
[
logP
]
, (3)
where throughout this paper, the base of the logarithm is chosen to be e. We introduce special notations
for distributions P and Q on the joint system A and B. We assume that their marginal distributions on
B are the same distribution PB and their conditional distributions on A condition with B are given as
PA|B and QA|B . Then, we use the notation D(PA|B‖QA|B|PB) :=
∑
b PB(b)D(PA|B=b‖QA|B=b). When a
distribution Q on A×B is given as PAB and a distribution Q on A×B is given as Q(a, b) = RB(b) by
using a distribution RB on A, we write D(P‖Q) as D(PAB‖RB).
For PAB ∈ P¯(A × B) and a normalized RB ∈ P(B), the conditional entropy H(PAB|RB) relative
to RB is defined to be −D(PAB‖RB). When PAB is a normalized distribution and RB is the marginal
distribution PB, H(PAB|PB) is a non-negative value. Then, we define the conditional minimum entropy
relative to RB [37]
Hmin(PAB|RB) := − log max
(a,b)∈supp(PAB)
PAB(a, b)
RB(b)
. (4)
The conditional Re´nyi entropy of order 2 relative to RB is defined as
H2(PAB|RB) := − log
∑
(a,b)∈supp(PAB)
PAB(a, b)
2
RB(b)
≥ Hmin(PAB|RB). (5)
C. Information quantity for higher order asymptotics
In this paper, to get higher order expansions, given two distributions P,Q ∈ P¯(A), we employ the
relative entropy variance V (P‖Q) and κ(P‖Q) as
V (P‖Q) :=VP
[
log
P
Q
]
(6)
κ(P‖Q) :=EP
[(− log P
Q
−D(P‖Q)√
V (P‖Q)
)3]
, (7)
4which equals the skewness, i.e., the normalized third cumulant of − log P
Q
. To define more complicated
values, we employ the lattice span d(P‖Q) of the variable − log PQ , which is defined in the beginning of
Section VIII. For example, when − log P
Q
is a continuous variable, the lattice span d(P‖Q) is zero. Then,
we define the function v(d) as
v(d) :=
{
log d
1−e−d when d > 0
0 when d = 0.
(8)
To describe the constant term of the asymptotic expansion, using v(d(P‖Q)) and Φ(x) :=
∫ x
−∞
1√
2π
exp(−x2
2
)dx,
we define
F ε1 (P‖Q) :=
√
V (P‖Q)κ(P‖Q)(Φ−1(ε)2 − 1)
6
+ ev(d(P‖Q)) (9)
F ε2 (P‖Q) :=
√
V (P‖Q)κ(P‖Q)(Φ−1(ε)2 − 1)
6
+ ev(d(P‖Q))
+ 3 log 2− 2− log π − log V (P‖Q)− Φ−1(ε)2 (10)
F ε3 (P‖Q) :=
√
V (P‖Q)κ(P‖Q)(Φ−1(ε)2 − 1)
6
+
7
2
log 2− 2− 1
2
log π − 1
2
log V (P‖Q)− 1
2
Φ−1(ε)2 − v(d(P‖Q)). (11)
F ε4 (P‖Q) :=
√
V (P‖Q)κ(P‖Q)(Φ−1(ε)2 − 1)
6
+
1
2
log(2πV (P‖Q)) + 1
2
Φ−1(ε)2 − v(d(P‖Q)) (12)
F ε5 (P‖Q) :=
√
V (P‖Q)κ(P‖Q)(Φ−1(ε)2 − 1)
6
− 1
2
log V (P‖Q)− v(d(P‖Q))− 1. (13)
Strassen [1] implicitly used the quantity F ε4 (P‖Q) for the non-lattice case, i.e., for the case of d = 0 in
the context of source coding with no side information and hypothesis testing. Kontoyiannis and Verdu´ [16]
explicitly discussed it for the non-lattice case in the context of source coding with no side information
as [16, (36)]. Also, Moulin [13] defined the quantity
√
V (P‖Q)κ(P‖Q)(Φ−1(ε)2−1)
6
+ 1
2
log(2πV (P‖Q)) +
1
2
Φ−1(ε)2 in [13, (2.12) and (2.14)] for the general case in the context of channel coding.
Remember that we defined D(PA|B‖QA|B|PB) and D(PAB‖RB) in the previous subsection. This kind of
definition is also applied to the quantities defined in this subsection. That is, V (PAB‖RB) and F εi (PAB‖RB)
are defined in the same way as in the previous subsection.
Although the definitions in Section II assume that the sets A and B are discrete, these definitions are
applied to the general measurable case when the sets A and B are measurable sets. In this case, P(A) is
the set of probability measures on A, P¯(A) is the set of non-negative measures on A, and P(B|A) is the
set of conditional probability measures µB|A=a on B conditioned with a ∈ A. In this case, the functions
P
Q
and Q
P
are defined as the Radon-Nikodym derivatives between two measures Q and P . The definition
(4) is generalized as
Hmin(PAB|RB) := − log inf
{
L
∣∣∣L ≥ PAB
RB
(a, b) holds almost everywhere with respect to PAB.
}
. (14)
However, the uniform distribution UA is defined only when A is discrete and finite.
III. SECURE RANDOM NUMBER GENERATION
A. Problem Formulation
Let PAE ∈ P¯(A × E) be a sub-normalized non-negative function. For a function f : A → S and the
key S = f(A), let
PSE(s, z) =
∑
x∈f−1(s)
PAE(a, e).
5We define the security by
d(f |PAE) = d(PSE, US × PE).
Although the quantity d(f |PAE) has no operational meaning for unnormalized PAE, it will be used to
derive bounds on d(f |PAE) for normalized PAE. For distribution PAE ∈ P(A×E) and security parameter
ε ≥ 0, we are interested in characterizing
ℓε(PAE) := sup{log |S| |∃f : X → S s.t. d(f |PAE) ≤ ε}.
The inverse function is given as
∆(m|PAE) := inf
f
d(f |PAE). (15)
B. Single shot Analysis
First, we employ the smooth minimum entropy framework that was mainly introduced and developed
by Renner and his collaborators [36], [37], [39], [40], [38]. Then, we define
Hεmin(PAE|RE) := max
QAE∈Bε(PAE)
Hmin(QAE |RE),
δmin(m|PAE|RE) := min
QAE∈P(A×E)
{d(QAE , PAE)|Hmin(QAE|RE) ≤ m}
where
Bε(PAE) := {QAE ∈ P(A× E) : d(PAE, QAE) ≤ ε} .
Then, we have a key lemma to derive a upper bound of ℓε(PAE).
Proposition 1 (Monotonicity [34, Lemma 2]): For any function f : X → S, PAE ∈ P(A × E), and
RE ∈ P(E), we have
Hεmin(PSE|RE) ≤ Hεmin(PAE |RE).

For readers’ convenience, we give a proof in Appendix A.
Using Proposition 1, we obtain the following proposition.
Proposition 2 ( [34, Theorem 1]): For PAE ∈ P(A× E), we have
ℓε(PAE) ≤ Hεmin(PAE|PE). (16)
The inequality is equivalent to
∆(m|PAE) ≥ δmin(m|PAE |RE). (17)

Since the paper [34] skips the detail proof of Proposition 2, we give its proof for reader’s convenience.
Proof of Proposition 2: Let f : A → S be a function to achieve the bound ℓε(PAE). Then, the
resultant distribution PSE satisfies d(PSE, US × PE) = ε. Since Hmin(US × PE |PE) = log |S| = ℓε(PAE),
we have Hεmin(PSE|RE) ≥ ℓε(PAE). Thus, Proposition 1 yields (17).
To derive the opposite evaluation, we introduce
∆min(m|PAE|RE) := min
QAE∈P¯(A×E)
2d(QAE, PAE) +
1
2
√
em−Hmin(QAE |RE) (18)
ℓεmin(PAE|RE) := max{m|∆min(m|PAE |RE) ≤ ε}. (19)
To improve the evaluation, using the conditional Re´nyi entropy of order 2, we define
∆2(m|PAE|RE) := min
QAE∈P¯(A×E)
2d(QAE, PAE) +
1
2
√
em−H2(QAE |RE) (20)
ℓε2(PAE|RE) := max{m|∆2(m|PAE|RE) ≤ ε}. (21)
6Then, we obtain the following opposite evaluation.
Proposition 3 ([34, Corollary 2][41, Lemma 23][9, Proposition 23]): For PAE ∈ P(A × E) and
RE ∈ P(E), we have
∆min(m|PAE |RE) ≥ ∆2(m|PAE|RE) ≥ ∆(m|PAE). (22)

For readers’ convenience, we give a proof in Appendix B.
Combining Propositions 2, 3, we have the following evaluation.
ℓεmin(PAE|RE) ≤ ℓε2(PAE|RE) ≤ ℓε(PAE) ≤ Hεmin(PAE|PE) (23)
for any distribution RE ∈ P(E).
C. Semi-finite block-length Analysis
To calculate the above upper and lower bounds, it is important to evaluate the values
(PAE)
2
PE
{
−
log PAE(a,e)
PE(e)
> m
}
and PAE
{
− log PAE(a,e)
PE(e)
≤ m
}
for a given value m. In the asymptotic situation, strong
large deviation is known as a method to precisely evaluate the first quantity and Edgeworth expansion is
a method to evaluate the difference between the Gaussian distribution and the second value. Combining
these two methods, we obtain semi-finite block-length analysis for the lower and upper bounds of ℓε(P nAE)
as follows.
Theorem 1: For PAE ∈ P(A× E), we have
Hεmin(P
n
AE|P nE) = nH(PAE|PE) +
√
n
√
V (PAE‖PE)Φ−1(ε) + F ε1 (PAE‖PE) +O(
1√
n
) (24)
ℓεmin(P
n
AE|P nE) = nH(PAE|PE) +
√
n
√
V (PAE‖PE)Φ−1(ε)− log n+ F ε2 (PAE‖PE) +O(
1√
n
) (25)
ℓε2(P
n
AE|P nE) ≥ nH(PAE|PE) +
√
n
√
V (PAE‖PE)Φ−1(ε)− 1
2
log n+ F ε3 (PAE‖PE) +O(
1√
n
). (26)

Theorem 1 is shown in Section IX.
D. Numerical comparison
We numerically compare our result with the previous results [34]. The paper [34, Theorem 2] derived
lower and upper bounds of ℓε(PAE) as
max
RE∈P(E)
Hǫ−ηsp (PZE|RE) + log 4η2 − 1
≤ℓε(PAE) ≤ Hεmin(PAE|PE) ≤ Hǫ−ζsp (PZE|PE)− log ζ. (27)
where
Hǫsp(PZE|RE) := inf
m
{
m
∣∣∣PAE{− log PAE(a, e)
PE(e)
≤ m
}
≤ ǫ
}
. (28)
Modifying leftover hash lemma (Proposition 3)[47], [48], the paper [34, Theorem 6] yields the following
lower bound.
max
0≤θ≤1
max
RE∈P(E)
θH1+θ(PZE|RE)
+ (1 + θ)Hǫ−ηsp (PZE|RE) + log 2η2 − 1
≤ℓε(PAE). (29)
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Secure Key Generation Rate
Fig. 1. Upper and lower bounds when ǫ = 0.001 and q = 0.11. The horizontal axis expresses the block-length n, and the vertical axis
expresses the secure key generation rate. Red solid curve expresses the upper bound 1
n
Hεmin(P
n
AE|PnE ), Green solid curve expresses the
lower bound 1
n
ℓε2(P
n
AE|PnE ), and Blue solid curve expresses the lower bound 1n ℓεmin(PnAE|PnE ). Red dashed curve expresses the upper bound
given in (27), Green dashed curve expresses the lower bound given in (29), Blue dashed curve expresses the lower bound given in (27), and
Black dashed curve expresses the lower bound given in (30).
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Fig. 2. Upper and lower bounds when n = 3000 and q = 0.11. The horizontal axis expresses log10(ǫ), and the vertical axis expresses the
secure key generation rate. Each line expresses upper or lower bound in the same way as Fig. 4.
Also, using an exponential upper bound of leaked information ∆(m|PAE) given in [32], the paper [34,
Theorem 5] derived the following lower bound.
sup
0≤θ≤1
θH1+θ(PZE|PE) + (1 + θ) log 2ǫ/3
θ
− 1 ≤ ℓε(PAE). (30)
Now, we consider the case such that E is obtained from A throughout BSC, i.e., A = E = F2 and
PAE(a, a) =
1− q
2
, PAE(a, a+ 1) =
q
2
(31)
In the following, all the information quantities equal those with E is a single element and PAE is given
as PA(0) = q and PA(1) = 1− q. For this comparison, similar to [34], we set RE to PE and η, ζ to ǫ/2
in (27), (29), and (30). When we choose q = 0.11 and ǫ = 10−3, upper and lower bounds for the secure
key generation rates are calculated by changing n in Fig. 4. When we choose q = 0.11 and n = 3000 and
100000, upper and lower bounds for the secure key generation rates are calculated by changing ǫ in Figs.
2 and 3, respectively. These figures show that our bounds improve the bounds in the previous paper [34].
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Secure Key Generation Rate
Fig. 3. Upper and lower bounds when n = 100000 and q = 0.11. The horizontal axis expresses log10(ǫ), and the vertical axis expresses
the secure key generation rate. Each line expresses upper or lower bound in the same way as Fig. 4.
E. Sacrifice bit-length
Next, we consider sacrifice bit-length when PA is the uniform distribution. We define the sacrifice
bit-length Sε(A|E|PAE) and its upper bounds as
Sε(A|E|PAE) := log |A| − ℓε(PAE) (32)
Sεmin(A|E|PAE|RE) := log |A| − ℓεmin(PAE|RE) (33)
Sε2(A|E|PAE|RE) := log |A| − ℓε2(PAE|RE) (34)
Iεmax(A;E|PAE|RE) := log |A| −Hεmin(PAE|RE). (35)
That is, we have
Sεmin(A|E|PAE|RE) ≥ Sε2(A|E|PAE|RE) ≥ Sε(A|E|PAE) ≥ Iεmax(A;E|PAE|PE). (36)
Since any measureQABE satisfiesHmin(QABE |RE) = Hmin(QABE |UB×RE)−log |B| andH2(QABE |RE) =
H2(QABE |UB × RE)− log |B|, we have
ℓε2(AB|E|PABE|RE) = ℓε2(A|BE|PABE|UB × RE)− log |B| (37)
ℓεmin(AB|E|PABE|RE) = ℓεmin(A|BE|PABE |UB × RE)− log |B|. (38)
Hence,
Sε2(AB|E|PABE|RE) = Sε2(A|BE|PABE |UB × RE) (39)
Sεmin(AB|E|PABE|RE) = Sεmin(A|BE|PABE |UB ×RE). (40)
Therefore, we have the following lemma.
Lemma 1: Any distribution RE of E satisfies
Sεmin(AB|E|PABE |RE) ≥ Sε2(AB|E|PABE|RE) ≥ Sε(A|BE|PABE). (41)

Proof: The first inequality follows from the first inequality in (23). The second inequality can be
shown as follows.
Sε2(AB|E|PABE |RE) = Sε2(A|BE|PABE|UB × RE) ≥ Sε(A|BE|PABE), (42)
where the first and second relations follow from (39) and the second inequality in (23), respectively.
9IV. HYPOTHESIS TESTING
Now, on a given system A, we study the simple hypothesis testing problem for the null hypothesis
P ∈ P(A) versus the alternative hypothesis Q ∈ P(A). However, in the following, we consider a more
generalized setting for the application in the later sections. That is, we assume that P ∈ P(A) and
Q ∈ P¯(A). In this setting, a test is given as a randomized function T taking values in [0, 1]. When
we observe A, we support Q with probability T (A) and does P with probability 1 − T (A). The error
probabilities of the first and the second are, respectively, defined by
α(T ) := EP [1− T ], β(T ) := EQ[T ]. (43)
We focus on the minimum of the error probability of the second kind under the constant constraint of the
error probability of the first kind;
βε(P‖Q) := min
T
{β(T )|α(T ) ≤ ε}. (44)
The hypothesis testing entropy is defined as
Dεh(P‖Q) := − log βε(P‖Q). (45)
We obtain its semi-finite block-length analysis as follows.
Theorem 2: When P ∈ P(A) and Q ∈ P¯(A), we have
Dεh(P
n‖Qn) = nD(P‖Q) +√n
√
V (P‖Q)Φ−1(ε) + 1
2
log n+ F ε4 (P‖Q) +O(
1√
n
). (46)

This theorem is shown in Subsection X-A.
Remark 1: In fact, Strassen [1, Section 3] claimed an asymptotic expansion for Dεh(P
n‖Qn). His
expansion is the same as ours in the non-lattice case. However, his extra term caused by the lattice span
d(P‖Q) is different from ours.
For a preparation of the analysis of channel coding, we introduce the following quantity.
∆DT (m|P‖Q) := min
ε
ε+ e−me−D
ε
h(P‖Q) (47)
DεDT (P‖Q) := max{m|∆DT (m|P‖Q) ≤ ε} (48)
We obtain its semi-finite block-length analysis as follows.
Theorem 3: When P ∈ P(A) and Q ∈ P¯(A), we have
DεDT (P
n‖Qn) = nD(P‖Q) +√n
√
V (P‖Q)Φ−1(ε) + F ε5 (P‖Q) +O(
1√
n
). (49)

This theorem is shown in Subsection X-B.
Remark 2: The paper [19] made a similar analysis. However, while they employ saddlepoint approx-
imation in addition to strong large deviation, our derivation is based on a simple combination of strong
large deviation and Edgeworth expansion.
V. FIXED-LENGTH SOURCE CODING
We consider fixed-length source coding. First, we discuss the case without side information when the
information is generated subject to the distribution PX . When we impose the decoding error probability
to be not greater than ε, we denote the minimum size of memory by N ε(X|PX). Counting the number
of input elements to be correctly decoded, we have
N ε(X|PX) =min
Ω⊂X
{|Ω| |PX(Ω) ≤ ε} = βε(PX‖I), (50)
where I is the counting measure. Hence, in the i.i.d. setting, using the asymptotic expansion given in
Theorem 2 for −Dεh(P nX‖In), we have
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logN ε(Xn|P nX) = nH(PX)−
√
n
√
V (PX‖I)Φ−1(ε)− 1
2
log n− F ε4 (PX‖I) +O(
1√
n
). (51)
Remark 3: Here, we should remark the relation between fixed-length source coding and lossless variable-
length source coding In lossless variable-length source coding, we focus on the overflow probability for
the respective coding length. As pointed in [16, Section I-D], the minium overflow probability for the
respective coding length equals N ε(X|PX). While the papers [2], [16] gave an asymptotic evaluation for
the minium overflow probability for the respective coding length, they can be regarded as the result for
N ε(X|PX).
In addition, the paper [16, Theorems 17 and 18] derived similar evaluation as (51). Their evaluation is
different from (51) in the following point. The equation (51) is the asymptotic expansion, in which we
did not exactly give an upper bound of the error term. It shows that the error term has the behavior with
order O( 1√
n
). In contrast, Theorems 17 and 18 in [16] gave upper and lower bounds without error. Hence,
their terms of the constant order are different from (51).
Next, we discuss the compression of the variable X with side information Y when the information
is generated subject to the distribution PX,Y . When we impose the decoding error probability to be not
greater than ε, we denote the minimum size of memory by N ε(X|Y |PX,Y ).
Proposition 4 ([27, Theorem 7]): For a probability distribution PX,Y ∈ P(X × Y), we have
−Dεh(PX,Y ‖PY ) ≤ logN ε(X|Y |PX,Y ) ≤ −DεDT (PX,Y ‖PY ). (52)

The first inequality of (52) is the same as the first inequality of [27, Theorem 7]. The second inequality
of (52) was essentially derived in the proof of the second inequality of [27, Theorem 7]. For the readers’
convenience, we show the second inequality of (52) in Appendix C.
Applying Theorems 2 and 3 to −Dεh(P nX,Y ‖P nY ) and −DεDT (P nX,Y ‖P nY ), respectively, we obtain the
following theorems.
Theorem 4: For a probability distribution PX,Y ∈ P(X × Y), we have
nH(PX,Y |PY )−
√
n
√
V (PX,Y ‖PY )Φ−1(ε)− 1
2
log n− F ε4 (PX,Y ‖PY ) +O(
1√
n
)
≤ logN ε(Xn|Y n|P nX,Y ) ≤ nH(PX,Y |PY )−
√
n
√
V (PX,Y ‖PY )Φ−1(ε)− F ε5 (PX,Y ‖PY ) +O(
1√
n
). (53)

VI. CHANNEL CODING
A. General case
Now, we consider a channel from the input discrete system X to the output system Y . The channel is
written as conditional distribution W . When the input distribution is PX , we denote the joint distribution
over X × Y by W × PX , and the output distribution over Y by W · PX . Then, the mutual information
is written as I(X ; Y )PX := D(W × PX‖(W · PX) × PX). The channel capacity is given by CW :=
maxPX I(X ; Y )PX . Then, we define
V+ := max
PX∈C
V (X ; Y )PX , V− := min
PX∈C
V (X ; Y )PX , (54)
where C := {P |CW = I(X ; Y )P} and V (X ; Y )PX := D(W × PX‖(W · PX) × PX). When ε < 12 , we
define Vε to be V−. Otherwise, we define Vε to be V+. We denote the distribution in C to attain Vε by Pε.
Under the channel W , we denote the maximum size of transmitted information with decoding error
probability ε > 0 by N ε(W ). Hence, when we use the channel W n times, this maximum number is
written as N ε(W n).
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Proposition 5 ([24, Remark 15][6]): For a channel W ∈ P(Y|X ) and a distribution PX ∈ P(X ), we
have
logN ε(W ) ≥ logN ε(W,PX) := DεDT (W × PX‖(W · PX)× PX). (55)

Proposition 6 ([25][26, Section 4.6][6]): For a channel W ∈ P(Y|X ), we have
logN ε(W ) ≤ min
QY ∈P(Y)
max
PX∈P(X )
Dεh(W × PX‖QY × PX). (56)

Substituting P nε and W
n into PX and W in Proposition 5 and Theorem 3, we obtain the following
theorem.
Theorem 5: For a channel W ∈ P(Y|X ), we have
logN ε(W n) ≥nCW +
√
n
√
VεΦ
−1(ε) + F ε5 (W × Pε‖(W · Pε)× Pε) +O(
1√
n
). (57)

In fact, the random coding union (RCU) bound achieves the lower bound nCW +
√
n
√
VεΦ
−1(ε) +
1
2
logn+O(1) under some restrictions for the channel [10, Corollary 54]. Our bound (57) has the following
advantage over the evaluation in [10, Corollary 54]. Unfortunately, their method did not identified the
constant-order term. When we need to use a lower bound whose constant-order term is determined, we
need to use (57) instead of the bound from the RCU bound. given in [10, Corollary 54].
B. Conditional additive channel
1) Direct part: On the other hand, a channel W is called conditional additive when Y is written as
X × Y˜ , X is an additive group, and the W (x, y˜|x′) = W (x−x′, y˜|0) relation holds. We denote the set of
conditional additive channels from X to Y by Pa(Y|X ). For example, as shown in [14, Section IV-C],
additive Gaussian channel with the BPSK scheme can be regarded as a conditional additive channel. In
the following discussion, we use the notation PX,Y˜ (x, y˜) := W (x, y˜|0). In this case, an encoder is called
algebraic when the message set is an additive group and the encoder is a homomorphism. In n uses
of the channel W , under the above restriction, we denote the maximum size of transmitted information
with decoding error probability ε > 0 by N εa(W ). Then, we have the relation N
ε(W ) ≥ N εa(W ) and the
following proposition.
Proposition 7 ([42],[14, Lemma 20]): For a conditional additive channel W ∈ Pa(Y|X ), the uniform
distribution UX on X satisfies
logN εa(W ) ≥ logN ε(W,UX). (58)

Now, we define PY (y) :=
∑
x′∈X
1
|X |W (y|x′) = UX(x)PY˜ (y˜) with y = (x, y˜). Then, we apply the above
discussion to the channelW n ∈ P(Yn|X n). For any xn ∈ X n, we haveDεDT (W nxn‖P nY ) = DεDT (P nX,Y˜ ‖P nY ),
where Wx(y) := W (y|x). Hence,
DεDT (W
n × UnX‖(W n · UnX)× UnX) = DεDT (W n0 ‖W n · UnX) = DεDT (P nX,Y˜ ‖P nY ). (59)
Using Proposition 7, the first equation in (59), and Theorem 3, we have the following theorem.
Theorem 6: For a conditional additive channel W ∈ Pa(Y|X ), we have
logN εa(W
n) ≥ DεDT (W n0 ‖W n · UnX)
=nC(W ) +
√
n
√
V (W0‖W · UXΦ−1(ε) + F ε5 (W0‖W · UX) +O(
1√
n
). (60)

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To get another expression of (60) based on the structure Y = X×Y˜ ,Z = X×Z˜ . we see D(PX,Y˜ ‖PY ) =
D(PX|Y˜ ‖UX |PY˜ ) = log |X |−H(PX,Y˜ |PY˜ ). Similarly, we have V (PX,Y˜ ‖PY ) = V (PX,Y˜ ‖PY˜ ), κ(PX,Y˜ ‖PY ) =
κ(PX,Y˜ ‖PY˜ ), and F εi (PX,Y˜ ‖PY ) = F εi (PX,Y˜ ‖PY˜ ) for i = 1, . . . , 5. Using Proposition 7, the second
equation in (59), Theorem 3, and these relations, we have the following theorem.
Theorem 7: For a conditional additive channel W ∈ Pa(Y|X ), we have
logN εa(W
n) ≥ DεDT (P nX,Y˜ ‖P nY )
=n(log |X | −H(PX,Y˜ |PY˜ )) +
√
n
√
V (PX,Y˜ ‖PY˜ )Φ−1(ε) + F ε5 (PX,Y˜ ‖PY˜ ) +O(
1√
n
). (61)

2) Converse part: Similarly, for any xn ∈ X n, we have Dεh(W nx ‖P nY ) = Dεh(P nX,Y˜ ‖P nY ). Hence,
Dεh(W
n × UnX‖(W n · UnX)× UnX) = Dεh(P nX,Y˜ ‖P nY ). Choosing QY n to be P nY , we have
Dεh(W
n × PXn‖P nY × PXn) = Dεh(P nX,Y˜ ‖P nY ). (62)
Using Proposition 6, (62), and Theorem 2, we have the following theorem.
Theorem 8: For a conditional additive channel W ∈ Pa(Y|X ), we have
logN εa(W
n) ≤ logN ε(W n) ≤ Dεh(P nX,Y˜ ‖P nY )
=n(log |X | −H(PX,Y˜ |PY˜ )) +
√
n
√
V (PX,Y˜ ‖PY˜ )Φ−1(ε) +
1
2
log n+ F ε4 (PX,Y˜ ‖PY˜ ) +O(
1√
n
). (63)

The paper [10, Theorem 55] derived the same evaluation up to the order log n under the weakly
input-symmetric condition [10, Definition 9], which is similar to the conditional additive condition, but
is different from it. The same relation was shown for general DMS channels in [11, Theorem 1] and
for AWGN channel with energy constraint in [6, Theorem 65]. Their achievability was shown in [10,
Corollary 54] and [12, (9)], respectively. However, they did not derive the constant term of the upper
bound.
The combination of the results [10] and [11] gives the tight evaluation up to the order log n. However,
their method does not give the evaluation of the error of the order O(1). Since the error of the order
O(1) cannot be estimated, their method cannot give the possible range of the maximum transmittable
length logN εa(W
n) precisely. On the other hand, the combination of Theorems 6 (7) and 8 gives upper
and lower bounds for the maximum transmittable length logN εa(W
n) with small error o(1/
√
n). Since
the error of the order o(1/
√
n) is guaranteed to converge to zero, our method gives the possible range of
the true value of logN εa(W
n) when n is sufficiently large.
VII. WIRE-TAP CHANNEL CODING
A. Direct part
Next, we consider wire-tap channel coding, in which, there are three players, the sender, and the
legitimate receiver, and the eavesdropper. The input system of the sender is written by X , and the systems
of the legitimate receiver and the eavesdropper are written by Y and Z , respectively. The channels to the
legitimate receiver and the eavesdropper are are written as conditional distributionsWY and WZ on Y and
Z with conditioned to X , respectively. Hence, a pair of channels (WY ,WZ) gives a wire-tap channel. In
n uses of these channels, the quality of this task for a wire-tap code φ is characterized by the decoding
error probability ε(φ) and the following secrecy measure
δ(φ) := d(PM,Z , PM × PZ), (64)
where PM,Z is the joint distribution of the messageM and the eavesdropper’s information Z, and PM×PZ
is the product distribution of the marginal distributions PM and PZ .
First, we discuss the performance when a wire-tap code is constructed from a specific algebraic error
correcting code. We assume that X is an additive group whose order is a prime power and a wire-tap
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channel WY ,WZ is conditional additive. Then, Y and Z are written as X × Y˜ and X × Z˜ , respectively.
In the following, we employ two distribution PX,Y˜ and PX,Z˜ defined as PX,Y˜ (x, y˜) := WY (x, y˜|0) and
PX,Z˜(x, z˜) := WZ(x, z˜|0). Then, we impose the algebraic condition to our code. In n uses of these
channels, under this restriction for codes, we choose an algebraic error correcting code with an encoder
φe and a decoder φd, and denote its coding size Nc(φe, φd). Then, we denote the message of this code by
M˜ and the set of messages by M˜. When the sender sends the message M˜ , we denote the joint distribution
of M˜ and the eavesdropper’s information Zn by PM˜,Zn . Since the size of the set X is a prime power,
that of M is also a prime power. Hence, we can choose sets M and L such that log |L| = ℓδ(PM˜,Zn) and
|M| · |L| = M˜. First, we choose a hash function f from M˜ →M such that d(f |PM˜,Zn) ≤ δ. We choose
a function gf from M·L to M˜ such that f(gf(m, l)) = m. Then, we define the encoder and the decoder
for wire-tap channel as follows. When the sender intended to transmit the message m, she generates the
random variable L subject to the uniform distribution on L, and transmit φe(gf(m,L)). The legitimate
receiver apply the function f ◦ φd to the received information Y n. We denote this code by φ(f, φe, φd)
As explained in [43, Appendix A], this kind of code construction is practical because we can choose an
error correcting code with small decoding complexity and the implementation of gf is also easy. Then,
we have
ε(φ(f, φe, φd)) ≤ ε and δ(φ(f, φe, φd)) ≤ δ. (65)
Denoting the size of the message of the wire-tap code φ by Nw(φ), we have
logNw(φ(f, φe, φd)) = logNc(φe, φd)− Sδ(M˜ |Zn|PM˜,Zn). (66)
Now, we consider the situation when the sender generates Xn subject to UnX . Then, we identify M˜
with an additive subgroup of X n. We can define the quotient set X n/M˜. For any element Xn ∈ X n,
we denote the coset in X n/M˜ which contains Xn by [Xn]. When the sender inform the coset inform
the information [Xn] to the eavesdropper, due to the algebraic structure, the information leakage does not
depends on the value [Xn]. Hence, we have
Sδ(M˜ |Zn|PM˜,Zn) = Sδ(Xn|[Xn], Zn|W nZ × UnX) ≤ Sδ2(Xn|Zn|W nZ × UnX |RnZ), (67)
where the inequality follows from Lemma 1. We denote Z by X ′ × Z˜ , where we use the notation X ′ to
distinguish the set from the input system X while it is the same set as X . Thus, we have
logNw(φ(f, φe, φd))
(a)
≥ logNc(φe, φd)− Sδ2(Xn|Zn|W nZ × UnX |(UX′ × PZ˜)n)
(b)
= logNc(φe, φd)− nC(WZ) +
√
n(
√
V (WZ|X=0‖WZ · UX)Φ−1(δ))
− 1
2
logn + F δ3 (WZ|X=0‖WZ · UX) +O(
1√
n
), (68)
where the inequality (a) follows from (66) and (67), and the equation (b) follows from the combination
of (23) and (26) in Theorem 1 with substituting UX′ × PZ˜ = WZ · UX into RZ . In the derivation, we
also use the relations V (WZ × UX‖UX′ × PZ˜) = V (WZ|X=0‖WZ · UX) and F δ3 (WZ × UX‖UX′ × PZ˜) =
F δ3 (WZ|X=0‖WZ · UX).
We rewrite the above evaluation by using the structure Y = X ×Y˜ ,Z = X ×Z˜ . When RZ = UX′×PZ˜ ,
Sδ2(X
n|Zn|W nZ × UnX |(UX′ × PZ˜)n) = Sδ2(Xn|X ′n, Z˜n|W nZ × UnX |UnX′ × PZ˜n) = Sδ2(Xn|Z˜n|P nX,Z˜|P nZ˜ ),
(69)
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where the second equation follows from the relation W nZ × UnX(x, x′, z˜) = 1|X |PX,Z˜(x′ − x, z˜). Therefore,
we have
logNw(φ(f, φe, φd))
(a)
≥ logNc(φe, φd)− Sδ2(Xn|Z˜n|P nX,Z˜ |P nZ˜ )
(b)
= logNc(φe, φd)− n(log |X | −H(PX,Z˜|PZ˜)) +
√
n
√
V (PX,Z˜‖PZ˜)Φ−1(δ)
− 1
2
log n+ F δ3 (PX,Z˜‖PZ˜) +O(
1√
n
), (70)
where the inequality (a) follows from (66), (67), and (69), and the equation (b) can be shown in the same
way as (68).
Now, we proceed the analysis on the optimal performance. For this aim, we denote the maximum size
of transmitted information under the conditions ε(φ) ≤ ε and δ(φ) ≤ δ by N ε,δ(WY ,WZ). The aim of the
following discussion is to evaluate N ε,δ(W nY ,W
n
Z ). We prepare an algebraic code for channel coding with
n use of the channel WY with the decoding error probability ε and the size of message N
ε
a(W
n
Y , U
n
X).
We apply this algebraic code to the above wire-tap code construction, which satisfies the condition (65).
Using (68) and Theorem 6, we have the following theorem.
Theorem 9: When X is an additive group whose order is a prime power and a wire-tap channel WY ,WZ
is conditional additive,
logN ε,δ(W nY ,W
n
Z )
≥n(C(WY )− C(WZ)) +
√
n(
√
V (WY |X=0‖WY · UX)Φ−1(ε) +
√
V (WZ|X=0‖WZ · UX)Φ−1(δ))
− 1
2
logn + F ε5 (WY |X=0‖WY · UX) + F δ3 (WZ|X=0‖WZ · UX) +O(
1√
n
). (71)

Using (68) and Theorem 7, we have the following theorem.
Theorem 10: Under the same assumption as Theorem 9, we have
logN ε,δ(W nY ,W
n
Z )
≥n(H(PX,Z˜|PZ˜)−H(PX,Y˜ |PY˜ )) +
√
n(
√
V (PX,Y˜ ‖PY˜ )Φ−1(ε) +
√
V (PX,Z˜‖PZ˜)Φ−1(δ))
− 1
2
log n+ F ε5 (PX,Y˜ ‖PY˜ ) + F δ3 (PX,Z˜‖PZ˜) +O(
1√
n
). (72)

The paper [35, Theorem 13] derived a similar evaluation as (71) and (72) up to the order of
√
n in
generic channels. While the discussed more generic channels, they did not derived the constant term.
B. Converse part
A wire-tap channel (WY ,WZ) is called degraded when there exists conditional distribution WZ|Y on Z
with conditioned to Y such that WZ(z|x) =
∑
y∈Y WZ|Y (y|z)WY (y|x). In this case, we define the joint
condition distribution W˜Y Z(y, z|x) := WZ|Y (z|y)WY (y|x). Indeed, there is a possibility that the true joint
condition distribution WY Z is different from W˜Y Z . Since our metric ε(φ) and δ(φ) depend on WY and
WZ , we do not need to care about the form of the true joint condition distribution WY Z .
Proposition 8 ([44, Theorem 6]): When a wire-tap channel WY ,WZ is degraded, we have
logN ε,δ(WY ,WZ) ≤ min
QY |Z∈P(Y|Z),QZ|X∈P(Z|X )
max
PX∈P(X )
Dε+δh (W˜Y Z × PX‖QY |Z ×QZ|X × PX). (73)

Remark 4: Originally, the paper [44] showed the above statement as their Theorem 6 when feedback
is allowed. Since the distribution PX corresponds to our code, the case with the distribution PX with
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no feedback corresponds to the case when no feedback is allowed. Hence, Theorem 6 of [44] yields the
above statement.
We define W˜Y |Z as W˜Y |Z(y|z)WZ(z|x)UX(x) = W˜Y Z(y, z|x)UX(x). Since the channels WY ,WZ are
conditional additive, we have Dεh(W˜
n
Y Z|X=xn‖(W˜Y |Z ×WZ|X=xn)n) = Dεh(W˜ nY Z|X=0‖(W˜Y |Z ×WZ|X=0)n)
for xn ∈ X n. Hence, Dεh(W˜ nY Z×PXn‖W˜ nY |Z×W nZ ×PXn) = Dεh(W˜ nY Z|X=0‖(W˜Y |Z×WZ|X=0)n). We have
D(W˜Y Z|X=0‖W˜Y |Z ×WZ|X=0) =D(W˜Y Z × PX‖W˜Y |Z ×WZ × PX) = I(X ; Y |Z)W˜Y Z×PX
=H(PX,Z˜|PZ˜)−H(PX,Y˜ |PY˜ ). (74)
Thus, we have the following theorem.
Theorem 11: When a wire-tap channel WY ,WZ is conditional additive and degraded, we have
logN ε,δ(W nY ,W
n
Z )
(a)
≤ Dε+δh (W˜ nY Z|X=0‖(W˜Y |Z ×WZ|X=0)n)
(b)
=n(H(PX,Z˜|PZ˜)−H(PX,Y˜ |PY˜ )) +
√
n
√
V (W˜Y Z|X=0‖W˜Y |Z ×WZ|X=0)Φ−1(ε+ δ)
+
1
2
log n+ F ε+δ4 (W˜Y Z|X=0‖W˜Y |Z ×WZ|X=0) +O(
1√
n
). (75)

Proof: The inequality (a) of (75) follows from Proposition 8. The second part (b) of (75) follows
from (74) and Theorem 2.
The paper [35, Theorem 13] derived a similar evaluation as (75) up to the order of
√
n in generic
channels. While the discussed more generic channels, they did not derived the constant term.
C. Binary symmetric channels
As an example of additive wire-tap channel, we consider the pair of binary symmetric channels, in
which, WY and WZ are the binary symmetric channels with crossover probability pY and pZ with
1
2
>
pZ > pY > 0 and X = Y = Z = F2. Hence, the sets Y˜ and Z˜ are trivial sets. Then, (72) is simplified to
logN ε,δ(W nY ,W
n
Z )
≥n(h(pZ)− h(pY )) +
√
n(
√
v(pY )Φ
−1(ε) +
√
v(pZ)Φ
−1(δ))− 1
2
logn + f ε5 (pY ) + f
δ
3 (pZ) +O(
1√
n
),
(76)
where h(p) is the binary entropy, v(p) is the varentropy, and f εi (p) is F
ε
i (P‖Q) when P is the binary
distribution with flip probability p and Q is the identify function 1.
Next, we proceed to the converse part. The channel W˜Z|Y is the binary symmetric channel with the
crossover probability pZ−pY
1−2pY , which is the solution of p + pY − 2ppY = pZ with respect to p. The
channel W˜Y |Z is also the binary symmetric channel with the crossover probability
pZ−pY
1−2pY . We define
two distributions P 1Y Z and P
2
Y Z as follows.
P 1Y Z(0, 0) = (1− pY )(1−
pZ − pY
1− 2pY ), P
1
Y Z(0, 1) = (1− pY )
pZ − pY
1− 2pY , (77)
P 1Y Z(1, 0) = pY (1−
pZ − pY
1− 2pY ), P
1
Y Z(1, 1) = pY
pZ − pY
1− 2pY . (78)
P 2Y Z(0, 0) = (1− pZ)(1−
pZ − pY
1− 2pY ), P
2
Y Z(0, 1) = pZ
pZ − pY
1− 2pY , (79)
P 2Y Z(1, 0) = (1− pZ)(1−
pZ − pY
1− 2pY ), P
2
Y Z(1, 1) = pZ
pZ − pY
1− 2pY . (80)
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Then, (75) is simplified to
logN ε,δ(W nY ,W
n
Z )
≤n(h(pZ)− h(pY )) +
√
n
√
V (P 1Y Z‖P 2Y Z)Φ−1(ε+ δ)
+
1
2
log n+ F ε+δ4 (P
1
Y Z‖P 2Y Z) +O(
1√
n
). (81)
Fig. 4 numerically compares the upper and lower bounds in (76) and (81). Also, it compares with the
second order approximations given in [35]. It shows that our higher correction is not so negligible.
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Fig. 4. Upper and lower bounds of the transmission rate when ǫ = δ = 0.001 and PZ = 0.2, PY = 0.1. The horizontal axis expresses the
block-length n, and the vertical axis expresses the transmission rate 1
n
logNε,δ(W nY ,W
n
Z ). Blue slid curve expresses the upper bound given
in (81), and Red slid curve expresses the lower bound given in (76). Blue dashed curve expresses the second order approximation of the
upper bound given in (81), and Red dashed curve expresses the second order approximation of the lower bound given in (76). The second
order approximation means the value up to the order
√
n in the respective terms.
D. BPSK scheme
As an example of conditional additive wire-tap channel, we consider a pair of BPSK Gaussian channels.
As shown in [14, Section IV-C], a BPSK Gaussian channel is conditional additive. Our Gaussian wire-tap
channel is given as
Y = X +NY , Z = X +NZ , (82)
where NY and NZ are subject to the Gaussian distribution with average 0 and variance σ
2
Y and σ
2
Z ,
respectively. We assume the relation σ2Y < σ
2
Z . The input signal X is limited to 1 or −1. Let ϕa,σ2 be the
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probability density function of the Gaussian distribution with average a and variance σ2. We define the
distribution ϕ˜σ by ϕ˜σ2(x) :=
1
2
ϕ1,σ2(x) +
1
2
ϕ−1,σ2(x). The evaluation (71) is rewritten as
logN ε,δ(W nY ,W
n
Z )
≥n(C(WY )− C(WZ)) +
√
n(
√
V (ϕ1,σ2Y ‖ϕ˜σ2Y )Φ−1(ε) +
√
V (ϕ1,σ2Z‖ϕ˜σ2Z )Φ−1(δ))
− 1
2
logn+ F ε5 (ϕ1,σ2Y ‖ϕ˜σ2Y ) + F δ3 (ϕ1,σ2Z‖ϕ˜σ2Z ) +O(
1√
n
). (83)
Next, we consider the converse part. The channel W˜Z|Y is given as
Z = Y +NZ|Y , (84)
where NZ|Y is subject to the Gaussian distribution with average 0 and variance σ2Z − σ2Y . Hence, the
probability density function of the joint conditional distribution pY Z|X(y, z|x) is given as pY Z(y, z) =
ϕx,σ2Y (y)ϕy,σ2Z(z). The probability density function of the joint distribution pY Z(y, z) is given as pY Z(y, z) =
ϕ˜σ2Y (y)ϕy,σ2Z(z). The probability density function of the conditional distribution pY |Z(y|z) is given as
pY |Z(y|z) = ϕ˜σ2
Y
(y)ϕy,σ2
Z
(z)ϕ˜σ2
Z
(z)−1. Therefore, (75) is simplified to
logN ε,δ(W nY ,W
n
Z )
≤n(C(WY )− C(WZ)) +
√
n
√
V (pY Z|X=0‖pY |Z × ϕ0,σ2Z )Φ−1(ε+ δ)
+
1
2
logn + F ε+δ4 (pY Z|X=0‖pY |Z × ϕ0,σ2Z ) +O(
1√
n
). (85)
The paper [35, Theorem 14] discussed the Gaussian channel with energy constraint. This paper focuses
on BPSK scheme, which is different from the result of [35, Theorem 14].
E. Secure communication based on correlated random variable
As an example of conditional additive wire-tap channel, we consider secure communication by the
correlated variables X˜, Y˜ , and Z˜, which are subject to the joint distribution PX˜,Y˜ ,Z˜ , and take values in X˜ , Y˜,
Z˜ , respectively [32, Section VI]. Assume that the sender, the legitimate receiver, and the eavesdropper
have the variables X˜ , Y˜ , and Z˜, respectively. We assume that X˜ equals an additive group X .
Then, we consider the wire-tap channel with the input system X in the following way. When the input
is X ∈ X , the sender sends X + X˜ to the legitimate receiver via a public channel. Hence, due to the
property of the public channel, the information X + X˜ is also leaked to the eavesdropper. That is, the
legitimate receiver receives the variable Y = (Y˜ , X + X˜) ∈ Y := X × Y˜ , and the eavesdropper receives
the variable Z = (Z˜, X + X˜) ∈ Z := X × Z˜ . The conditional distribution to characterize our wire-tap
channel is given as WY (x˜, y˜|x) = PX˜,Y˜ (x˜− x, y˜) and WZ(x˜, z˜|x) = PX˜,Z˜(x˜− x, z˜). Hence, the wire-tap
channel WY ,WZ is conditional additive. In this model, we have PX,Y˜ = PX˜,Y˜ and PX,Z˜ = PX˜,Z˜ . Hence,
we obtain a lower bound of logNε,δ,n,a(WY ,WZ) of this model by replacing PX,Y˜ and PX,Z˜ by PX˜,Y˜ and
PX˜,Z˜ in the RHS of (72).
Next, we consider the converse part. For this aim, we assume the Markovian chain X˜ − Y˜ − Z˜.
Using WZ|Y (x˜, z˜|x˜, y˜) := δx˜,x˜′PZ˜|Y˜ (z˜|y˜), we have WZ|Y ·WY |X = WZ|X . Hence, this wire-tap channel
is degraded. Also, W˜Y |Z is calculated as W˜Y |Z(x˜, y˜|x˜, z˜) = δx˜,x˜′PY˜ |Z˜(y˜|z˜). Since WY Z(x˜, y˜, x˜′, z˜|x) =
δx˜,x˜′PX˜,Y˜ ,Z˜(x˜− x, y˜, z˜), we have
WY Z|X=0(x˜, y˜, x˜
′, z˜) = δx˜,x˜′PX˜,Y˜ ,Z˜(x˜, y˜, z˜) (86)
W˜Y |Z ×WZ|X=0(x˜, y˜, x˜′, z˜) = δx˜,x˜′PY˜ |Z˜(y˜|z˜)PX˜,Z˜(x˜′, z˜). (87)
Hence, the upper bound of logN ε,δ(W nY ,W
n
Z ) given in the RHS of (75) can be calculated to
n(H(PX˜,Z˜|PZ˜)−H(PX˜,Y˜ |PY˜ )) +
√
n
√
V (PX˜,Y˜ ,Z˜‖PY˜ |Z˜ × PX˜,Z˜)Φ−1(ε+ δ)
+
1
2
log n+ F ε4 (PX˜,Y˜ ,Z˜‖PY˜ |Z˜ × PX˜,Z˜) +O(
1√
n
). (88)
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VIII. STRONG LARGE DEVIATION AND EDGEWORTH EXPANSION
Let p be a non-negative measure and dS be the lattice span of the real valued function X , which is
defined as follows. Let S be the set of the support of the measure p ◦ X−1. When there exists a non-
negative value x satisfying {a− b}a,b∈S ⊂ xZ, the real valued function X is called a lattice function or
a lattice variable. Then, the lattice span dS is defined as the maximum value of the above non-negative
value x. Denoting all of elements of S as a1 < a2 < . . . < al, we have
dS = min
ni∈Z
{ l∑
i=1
niai
∣∣∣∣∣
l∑
i=1
ni = 0,
l∑
i=1
niai > 0
}
(89)
due to the following reason; When integers y1, . . . , yl have the greatest common divisor 1, there exist
integers n1, . . . , nl such that
∑l
i=1 niyi = 1. When there does not exist such a non-negative value x, the
real valued function X is called a non-lattice function or a non-lattice variable. Then, the lattice span dS
is regarded as zero. Now, we summarize the fundamental properties for the lattice and non-lattice cases.
For this purpose, we denote the set {∑ni=1 ai}ai∈S by Sn.
Lemma 2: We fix a small real number δ > 0. In the lattice case, there exists a sufficiently large
integer N such that Sn satisfies the following condition for any n ≥ N . Denote all of elements of
Sn ∩ [n(a1 + δ), n(al − δ)] as b1 < b2 < . . . < bk. We have bi+1 − bi = dS .
In the non-lattice case, for an arbitrary small real number ε, there exists a sufficiently large integer N
such that Sn satisfies the following condition for any n ≥ N . Denote all of elements of Sn ∩ [n(a1 +
δ), n(al − δ)] as b1 < b2 < . . . < bk. We have bi+1 − bi < ε. 
Proof: Lattice case: Since the definition of dS guarantees that bi+1 − bi ≥ dS, it is enough to
show that bi+1 − bi ≤ dS . Assume that integers ni satisfies the equations
l∑
i=1
niai = dS (90)
l∑
i=1
ni = 0. (91)
We define the subsets S+ := {ai ∈ S|ni ≥ 0} and S− := {ai ∈ S|ni < 0}, the positive integers
m2 :=
∑
i:ai∈S+ ni and m1 := (al − a1)/dS, and the positive real numbers A := −m1
∑
i:ai∈S− niai,
B := m1
∑
i:ai∈S+ niai, δ− := (A− a1m1m2)/n, and δ+ := (alm1m2 − B +m1ds)/n.
So, we have n(a1+δ−) = a1(n−m1m2)+A = na1+(A−a1m1m2) and n(al−δ+) = al(n−m1m2)+B =
nal − (alm1m2−B). We choose an element x := n(a1 + δ−) + (c1m1 + c2)dS ∈ [n(a1 + δ−), n(al − δ+)]
with integers c1 and c2 ≤ m1. When (c1m1 + c2) takes the maximum, x is n(al − δ+), i.e., c1m1 + c2 =
(n−m1m2)m1. So, the maximum of c1 is n−m1m2.
Using (90) and the definitions of δ− an A, we have
x =c1al + (n− c1 −m1m2)a1 + c2
( ∑
i:ai∈S+
niai
)
− (m1 − c2)
∑
i:ai∈S−
niai
(a)∈ Sn. (92)
Here, the relation (a) follows from the following facts; c1 and (n− c1−m1m2) are non-negative integers,
c2ni is a non-negative integer for i ∈ S+, and −(m1 − c2)ni is a non-negative integer for i ∈ S−. Thus,
when we denote all of elements of Sn ∩ [n(a1 + δ−), n(al − δ+)] as b1 < b2 < . . . < bk. We have
bi+1 − bi ≤ dS . When n is sufficiently large, we have δ−, δ+ ≤ δ. So, we obtain the desired statement.
Non-lattice case: For an arbitrary ε > 0, we can take integers ni such that 0 < d˜ :=
∑l
i=1 niai < ε and∑l
i=1 ni = 0. (If impossible, we have the minimum of
∑l
i=1 niai with
∑l
i=1 ni = 0 is strictly larger than
0, which contradicts dS = 0.) We redefine m1 := ⌈(al−a1)/ε⌉, and define other terms in the same way by
replacing dS by d˜. Using the same discussion, we find that the element x := n(a1+δ−)+c1(al−a1)+c2d˜ ∈
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[n(a1 + δ−), n(al − δ+)] with c2 ≤ m1 belongs to Sn. When n is sufficiently large, we have δ−, δ+ ≤ δ.
So, we have bi+1 − bi < ε.
Here p is not necessarily normalized. Define the notation Ep[X ]
def
=
∫
X(ω)p(dω). Define the cumulant
generating function τ(s)
def
= logEp[e
sX ]. Denote the inverse function of the derivative τ ′(s) by η.
Proposition 9 (Bahadur and Rao [17], [45, Theorem 3.7.4]): Assume that τ(0) <∞. When R > Ep[X]
Ep[1]
,
we have
log pn{Xn ≥ nR}
=χ0(R)n− 1
2
log n+ χ1(R) + χ2(R)
1
n
+ o(
1
n
), (93)
log pn{Xn ≤ nR} = nτ(0) + o(1), (94)
where
χ0(R)
def
= −Rη(R) + τ(η(R)) (95)
and
χ1(R)
def
=
{
−1
2
log 2π − log η(R) + 1
2
log η′(R) if dS = 0
−1
2
log 2π + 1
2
log η′(R) + log dS
1−e−dSη(R) if dS > 0,
(96)
and χ2(R) is a continuous function. The convergences of the differences between the LHSs and RHSs
are compact uniform. 
As a generalization of the function v(d), we define the function v(d, s) as
v(d, s) :=
{
log d
1−e−ds when d > 0
− log s when d = 0. (97)
Using this function, we have the following lemma.
Lemma 3: Assume that τ ′(s0) = R0 and s0 > 0. When R = R0 + R1√n +
R2
n
, we have
log pn{Xn ≥ nR}
=n(−Rs0 + τ(s0))− 1
2
log(2πτ ′′(s0)n) + v(dS, s0)− R
2
1
2τ ′′(s0)
+O(
1√
n
). (98)

Proof: Let s be the real number to satisfy τ ′(s) = R. Since τ ′(s) = τ ′(s0)+ τ ′′(s0)(s− s0)+O((s−
s0)
2), we have s− s0 = R−R0τ ′′(s0) +O((s− s0)2). Thus,
χ0(R) =−Rs+ τ(s) = −Rs + τ(s0) + τ ′(s0)(s− s0) + 1
2
τ ′′(s0)(s− s0)2 +O((s− s0)3)
=−Rs0 + τ(s0)−R(s− s0) + τ ′(s0)(s− s0) + 1
2
τ ′′(s0)(s− s0)2 +O((s− s0)3)
=−Rs0 + τ(s0)− (R− R0)(s− s0) + 1
2
τ ′′(s0)(s− s0)2 +O((s− s0)3)
=−Rs0 + τ(s0)− (R− R0)
2
2τ ′′(s0)
+O((s− s0)3), (99)
and
η′(R) =
1
τ ′′(s)
=
1
τ ′′(s0)
+O(s− s0). (100)
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In the non-lattice case, we have
χ1(R)
=− 1
2
log 2π − log η(R) + 1
2
log η′(R) = −1
2
log 2π − log s + 1
2
log η′(R)
=− 1
2
log 2π − log s0 − 1
2
log τ ′′(s0) +O(s− s0). (101)
Since s − s0 = O( 1√n) and R − R0 = R1√n + O( 1n), the combination of Proposition 9, (99), and (101)
implies (98).
In the lattice case, we replace − log η(R) by log dS
1−e−dSη(R) . This value is calculated to be v(dS, s0) +
O( 1√
n
). Hence, we obtain (98).
When R is close to τ ′(0), we have the Gaussian approximation. In this case, we have Edgeworth
expansion instead of the strong large deviation.
Proposition 10 ([46]): Assume that p is a probability distribution. Define the skewness, i.e., the
normalized version of the third cumlant
κ := Ep
[(X − Ep[X ]√
Vp[X ]
)3]
=
τ ′′′(0)
τ ′′(0)3/2
. (102)
Then, we have
pn{Xn ≤ nE[X ] +
√
n
√
V [X ]x} = Φ(x)− ϕ(x)κ(x
2 − 1)
6
1√
n
+O(
1
n
), (103)
where ϕ is the probability density function of the standard Gaussian distribution. 
IX. PROOF OF THEOREM 1
In this section, we abbreviate d(PAE‖PE) to d. To prove the relation (24), we prepare the following
Lemma.
Lemma 4: For PAE ∈ P(A× E), we have
δmin(m|PAE|PE) = PAE
{
− log PAE(a, e)
PE(e)
≤ m
}
− e−mPE
{
− log PAE(a, e)
PE(e)
≤ m
}
. (104)

Proof: First, we use another expression of δmin(m|PAE|PE) as
δmin(m|PAE|PE) = min
QAE∈P(A×E)
{2d(QAE, PAE)|Hmin(QAE |PE) ≤ m}.
Th optimal QAE,opt ∈ P(A× E) is given as follows.
QAE,opt(a, e) :=
{
e−mPE(e) when − log PAE(a,e)PE(e) ≤ m
PAE(a, e) when − log PAE(a,e)PE(e) > m.
(105)
Since 2d(QAE,opt, PAE) equals to the RHS of (104), we obtain Eq. (104).
The relation (24) follows from the following Lemma 5.
Lemma 5: For PAE ∈ P(A× E), we have
Hεmin(P
n
AE|P nE) = nH(PAE|PE) +
√
n
√
V (PAE‖PE)Φ−1(ε) + F ε1 (PAE‖PE) +O(
1√
n
). (106)

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Proof:We choosem := nH(PAE|PE)+
√
n
√
V (PAE‖PE)B1+
√
V (PAE‖PE)B2 with B1 := Φ−1(ε).
We apply Proposition 10 to the case with X = − log PAE
PE
and the distribution PAE . Then, we obtain
P nAE
{
− log P
n
AE(a, e)
P nE(e)
≤ m
}
=Φ(B1)− ϕ(B1)κ(PAE‖PE)(B
2
1 − 1)
6
√
n
+ ϕ(B1)
B2√
n
+O(
1
n
)
=ε+
1√
2πn
e−B
2
1/2(B2 − κ(PAE‖PE)(B
2
1 − 1)
6
) +O(
1
n
). (107)
Next, we apply Lemma 3 to the case with the measure PE on A× E , X = log PAEPE , R = −mn , s0 = 1,
and R0 = −H(PAE‖PE). Then, we obtain
log
[
e−mPE
{
− log P
n
AE(a, e)
P nE(e)
≤ m
}]
=− 1
2
log(2πV (PAE‖PE)n)− B
2
1
2
+ v(d) +O(
1√
n
). (108)
Hence, we have
δmin(m|P nAE |P nE)
(a)
= P nAE
{
− log P
n
AE(a, e)
P nE(e)
≤ m
}
− e−mPE
{
− log P
n
AE(a, e)
P nE(e)
≤ m
}
(b)
=ε+
1√
2πn
e−B
2
1/2(B2 − κ(PAE‖PE)(B
2
1 − 1)
6
)− 1√
2πV (PAE‖PE)n
e−
1
2
B21+v(d) +O(
1
n
), (109)
where (a) follows from Lemma 4, and (b) follows from the combination (107) and (108). The equation
δmin(m|P nAE|P nE) = ε+O( 1n) holds if and only if the following relation holds
log(B2 − κ(PAE‖PE)(B
2
1 − 1)
6
) = −1
2
log V (PAE‖PE) + v(d), (110)
which implies
B2 =
κ(PAE‖PE)(B21 − 1)
6
+
1√
V (PAE‖PE)
ev(d). (111)
Therefore, the equation δmin(m|P nAE|P nE) = ε+O( 1n) holds if and only if
√
V (PAE‖PE)B2 = F ε1 (PAE‖PE).
This statement is equivalent to the desired statement.
For the proofs of (25) and (26), we prepare the following two lemmas.
Lemma 6: The maximum maxx x− aex/2 equals 2(log 2− log a− 1) and it is achieved by x = 2 log 2a .
The maximum maxx x− aex equals − log a− 1 and it is achieved by x = − log a. 
Lemma 7: For PAE ∈ P(A× E), we have
ℓεmin(PAE |PE) = max{m′|∃m such that δmin(m|PAE|PE) +
1
2
e
m′−m
2 ≤ ε}. (112)

Proof: We have
δmin(m
′|PAE|PE) = 2δ¯min(m′|PAE|PE). (113)
Also, we have
∆min(m
′|PAE|PE) = min
QAE∈P¯(A×E)
2d(QAE, PAE) +
1
2
√
em′−Hmin(QAE |PE)
= min
m
2δ¯min(m|PAE |PE) + 1
2
e
m′−m
2 . (114)
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Combining (113) and (114), we have
∆min(m
′|PAE|PE) = min
m
δmin(m|PAE|PE) + 1
2
e
m′−m
2 . (115)
Hence, we obtain (112).
The relation (25) follows from the following Lemma 8.
Lemma 8: For PAE ∈ P(A× E), we have
ℓεmin(P
n
AE |P nE) = nH(PAE|PE) +
√
n
√
V (PAE‖PE)Φ−1(ε)− log n+ F ε2 (PAE‖PE) +O(
1√
n
). (116)

Proof: In this proof, we employ the expression of ℓεmin(PAE |PE) given in Lemma 7. We choose
m := nH(PAE|PE)+
√
n
√
V (PAE‖PE)B1+
√
V (PAE‖PE)B2 and m′ := m+log 2− log(πn)+B3 with
B1 = Φ
−1(ε). Using (109), we have
(δmin(m|P nAE|P nE) +
1
2
e
m′−m
2 )− ε
=
1√
2πn
e−B
2
1/2(B2 − κ(PAE‖PE)(B
2
1 − 1)
6
) +O(
1
n
)− 1√
2πV (PAE‖PE)n
e−
1
2
B21+v(d) +O(
1
n
) +
1√
2πn
e
B3
2
=
1√
2πn
(e−B
2
1/2(B2 − κ(PAE‖PE)(B
2
1 − 1)
6
)− 1√
V (PAE‖PE)
e−
1
2
B21+v(d) + e
1
2
B3) +O(
1
n
). (117)
The relation
e−B
2
1/2(B2 − κ(PAE‖PE)(B
2
1 − 1)
6
)− 1√
V (PAE‖PE)
e−
1
2
B21+v(d) + e
1
2
B3 = 0 (118)
holds if and only if
B2 = B2,min(B3) :=
κ(PAE‖PE)(B21 − 1)
6
+
1√
V (PAE‖PE)
ev(d) − e 12 (B3+B21). (119)
Applying Lemma 6, we have√
V (PAE‖PE)max
B3
B2,min(B3) +B3
=max
B3
√
V (PAE‖PE)(κ(PAE‖PE)(B
2
1 − 1)
6
+
1√
V (PAE‖PE)
ev(d) − e 12 (B3+B21)) +B3
=
√
V (PAE‖PE)(κ(PAE‖PE)(B
2
1 − 1)
6
+
1√
V (PAE‖PE)
ev(d)) + 2 log 2− log V (PAE‖PE)− B21 − 2.
(120)
Due to the combination of (117), (119), (120), and Lemma 7, when B2 is chosen in (119) and B3 is
chosen to achieve the maximum in (120), the value m′ equals to the RHS of (116) because the sum of
the RHS of (120) and log 2− log π equals F ε2 (PAE‖PE). Hence, we obtain (116).
To prove the relation (26), we prepare the following lemma.
Lemma 9: For PAE ∈ P(A× E), we have
∆2(m
′|PAE|PE) =min
f
EPAE [1− f ] +
1
2
√
2m′EP2
AE
PE
[f 2] (121)
≤min
m
∆2(m
′, m|PAE|PE), (122)
23
where f is a function taking values in [0, 1] and
∆2(m
′, m|PAE|PE) := PAE
{
− log PAE(a, e)
PE(e)
≤ m
}
+
1
2
em
′/2
√
(PAE)2
PE
{
− log PAE(a, e)
PE(e)
> m
}
.
(123)
That is,
ℓε2(PAE|PE) ≥ max{m′|∃m such that ∆2(m′, m|PAE|PE) ≤ ε}. (124)

Proof: While we have ∆2(m
′|PAE|PE) = minQ∈P¯(A×E) d(Q,PAE)+ 2(m′−H2(Q|PE))/2, we can restrict
Q to a measure of the form PAEf . In this case, e
−H2(Q|PE) =
∑
a,e PAE(a, e)
2f(a, e)2PE(e). Hence, we
obtain (121). We restrict the function f to be a test function with support
{
− log PAE(a,e)
PE(e)
> m
}
. Then,
we obtain the inequality (122).
The relation (26) follows from the following Lemma 10.
Lemma 10: For PAE ∈ P(A× E), we have
ℓε2(P
n
AE|P nE) ≥ nH(PAE|PE) +
√
n
√
V (PAE‖PE)Φ−1(ε)− 1
2
log n+ F ε3 (PAE‖PE) +O(
1√
n
). (125)

Proof: We choose m := nH(PAE|PE) +
√
n
√
V (PAE‖PE)B1 +
√
V (PAE‖PE)B2 and m′ := m +
2 log 2 − 1
2
log(2πn) + B3 with B1 = Φ
−1(ε). We apply Lemma 3 to the case with the measure P
2
AE
PE
on
A× E , X = − log PAE
PE
, R = m
n
, s0 = 1, and R0 = H(PAE|PE). Then, we obtain
m′
2
+
1
2
log
(P nAE)
2
P nE
{
− log P
n
AE(a, e)
P nE(e)
> m
}
=
m′
2
+
1
2
(
−m− 1
2
log(2πn)− 1
2
((log V (PAE‖PE)) +B21) + v(d) +O(
1√
n
)
)
= log 2− 1
2
log(2πn)− 1
4
((log V (PAE‖PE)) +B21) +
v(d)
2
+
B3
2
+O(
1√
n
). (126)
Combining (107) and (126), we have
∆2(m
′, m|P nAE|P nE)
=Φ(B1) +
1√
2πn
e−B
2
1/2(
κ(PAE‖PE)(B21 − 1)
6
− B2) + 1√
2πnV (PAE‖PE)1/4
e−
1
4
B21+
v(d)
2
+ 1
2
B3 +O(
1
n
).
(127)
The relation
e−B
2
1/2(B2 − κ(PAE‖PE)(B
2
1 − 1)
6
) +
1
V (PAE‖PE)1/4 e
− 1
4
B21+
v(d)
2
+ 1
2
B3 = 0 (128)
holds if and only if
B2 = B2,2(B3) :=
κ(PAE‖PE)(B21 − 1)
6
− 1
V (PAE‖PE)1/4 e
1
4
B21+
v(d)
2
+ 1
2
B3 . (129)
Lemma 6 implies that
max
B3
√
V (PAE‖PE)B2,2(B3) +B3
=max
B3
√
V (PAE‖PE)(κ(PAE‖PE)(B
2
1 − 1)
6
− 1
V (PAE‖PE)1/4 e
1
4
B21+
v(d)
2
+ 1
2
B3) +B3
=
√
V (PAE‖PE)κ(PAE‖PE)(B
2
1 − 1)
6
+ 2 log 2− 2− 1
2
log V (PAE‖PE)− 1
2
B21 − v(d). (130)
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Due to the combination of (127) and (130) yields (125), when B2 is chosen in (129) and B3 is chosen to
achieve the maximum in (130), the value m′ equals to the RHS of (125) because the sum of the RHS of
(130) and 2 log 2− 1
2
log(2π) equals F ε3 (PAE‖PE). Hence,max{m′|∃m such that ∆2(m′, m|P nAE|P nE) ≤ ε}
equals the RHS of (125). Using Lemma 9, we obtain (125).
X. PROOF OF THEOREMS 2 AND 3
A. Proof of Theorem 2
In this section, we abbreviate d(P‖Q) to d. We choosem := nD(P‖Q)+
√
n
√
V (P‖Q)B1+
√
V (P‖Q)B2
with B1 = Φ
−1(ε). We apply Proposition 10 to the case with X = log P
Q
and the distribution P . Then,
we obtain
P n
{
log
P n(a)
Qn(a)
≤ m
}
=Φ(B1)− ϕ(B1)κ(P‖Q)(B
2
1 − 1)
6
√
n
+ ϕ(B1)
B2√
n
+O(
1
n
)
=ε+
1√
2πn
e−B
2
1/2(B2 − κ(P‖Q)(B
2
1 − 1)
6
) +O(
1
n
). (131)
The relation P n
{
log P
n(a)
Qn(a)
≤ m
}
= ε+O( 1
n
) holds if and only if
B2 =
κ(P‖Q)(B21 − 1)
6
. (132)
Next, we apply Lemma 3 to the case with the measure Q on A, X = log P
Q
, R = m
n
, s0 = 1, and
R0 = D(P‖Q). Then, we obtain
log
[
Qn
{
log
P n(a)
Qn(a)
> m
}]
=−m− 1
2
log(2πV (P‖Q)n)− 1
2
B21 + v(d) +O(
1√
n
). (133)
The combination of (133) and (132) yields (46).
B. Proof of Theorem 3
Define
∆DT (m
′, m|P‖Q) := P
{
log
P (a)
Q(a)
≤ m
}
+ em
′
[
Q
{
log
P (a)
Q(a)
> m
}]
. (134)
We find that
∆DT (m
′|P‖Q) = min
m
∆DT (m
′, m|P‖Q). (135)
Hence, we have
DεDT (P‖Q) = max{m′|∃m such that ∆DT (m′, m|P‖Q) ≤ ε}. (136)
Due to (133), the second term has the order 1/
√
n if and only we have m′ = m+ B3. We choose m in
the same way as the proof of Theorem 2. Combining (131) and (133), we have
∆DT (m
′, m|P n‖Qn)
=ε+
1√
2πn
e−B
2
1/2(B2 − κ(P‖Q)(B
2
1 − 1)
6
) +
1√
2πV (P‖Q)ne
B3− 12B21+v(d) +O(
1
n
). (137)
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TABLE I
SUMMARY OF OBTAINED RESULTS.
Setting Direct Converse Matched Order
Secure Random Num. Gen. Theorem 1 and (23) O(
√
n)
Binary hypothesis testing Theorems 2 and 3 O(1)
Source coding with side info. Theorem 4 O(
√
n)
Channel coding Theorems 6 and 7 Theorem 8 O(
√
n)
Wire-tap channel coding Theorems 9 and 10 Theorem 11 O(n)
Matched order means the lowest order, in which, the upper bound and lower bound match each other.
Hence,
(B2 − κ(P‖Q)(B
2
1 − 1)
6
) +
1
V (P‖Q)1/2 e
B3+v(d) = 0 (138)
if and only if
B2 =
κ(P‖Q)(B21 − 1)
6
− 1
V (P‖Q)1/2 e
B3+v(d). (139)
Lemma 6 implies that
max
B3
√
V (P‖Q)(κ(P‖Q)(B
2
1 − 1)
6
− 1
V (P‖Q)1/2 e
B3+v(d)) +B3
=
√
V (P‖Q)κ(P‖Q)(B
2
1 − 1)
6
− 1
2
log V (P‖Q)− v(d)− 1. (140)
When B2 is chosen in (139) and B3 is chosen to achieve the maximum in (140), the value m
′ equals to the
RHS of (49) because the RHS of (140) equals F ε5 (P‖Q). Hence,max{m′|∃m such that ∆DT (m′, m|P n‖Qn) ≤
ε} equals the RHS of (49). Using (136), we obtain (49).
XI. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we have made semi-finite length analysis for upper and lower bounds for various problems,
secure random number generation, simple binary hypothesis testing, fixed-length source coding with
and without side information, channel coding with conditional additive channel, and wire-tap channel
coding with conditional additive and degraded channel. Obtained results are summarized in Table I.
Unfortunately, we could not discuss the random coding union (RCU) bound because it requires more
complicated evaluation. Since the RCU bound is better than the DT bound, higher order expansion of the
RCU bound is an interesting future problem.
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APPENDIX A
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 1
Let P˜SZ ∈ Bε(PSZ) be such that
Hεmin(PSZ|RE) = Hmin(P˜SZ|RE).
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Then, we define
P˜AE(a, e) = P˜SZ(f(x), z)
PAE(a, e)
PSZ(f(x), z)
.
Then, we have
d(P˜AE, PAE)
=
1
2
∑
x,z
|P˜AE(a, e)− PAE(a, e)|
=
1
2
∑
s,z
∑
x∈f−1(s)
PAE(a, e)
PSZ(s, z)
|P˜SZ(s, z)− PSZ(s, z)|
=
1
2
∑
s,z
|P˜SZ(s, z)− PSZ(s, z)|
= d(P˜SZ , PSZ)
≤ ε.
Thus, we have P˜AE ∈ Bε(PAE). Furthermore, by the construction of P˜AE , we have P˜AE(a, e) ≤ P˜SZ(f(x), z)
for every (a, e). Thus, we have
Hεmin(PSZ|RE) = Hmin(P˜SZ|RE)
≤ Hmin(P˜AE|RE)
≤ Hεmin(PAE|RE).
APPENDIX B
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 3
Since the first inequality in (22) follows from (5), we show the second inequality in (22). Then, we
define
H¯εmin(PAE|RE) := max
QAE∈B¯ε(PAE)
Hmin(QAE|RE),
where
B¯ε(PAE) =
{
QAE ∈ P¯(A× E) : d(PAE, QAE) ≤ ε
}
.
The following is a key lemma to derive every lower bound of ℓ(PAE , ε).
Lemma 11 (Leftover Hash:[36],[48],[47]): Let F be the uniform random variable on a set of universal
2 hash family F . Then, for PAE ∈ P¯(A× E) and RE ∈ P(E), we have1
EF [d(F |PAE)] ≤ 1
2
√
|S|2−H2(PAE |RE).

Furthermore, since
d(PAE|f) ≤ 2ε+ d(P¯AE|f)
holds for P¯AE ∈ B¯ε(PAE) by the triangular inequality, we have the following.
Corollary 1 ([34, Corollary 2]): For PAE ∈ P(A× E) and RE ∈ P(E), we have
EF [d(F |PAE)] ≤ 2ε+ 1
2
√
|S|2−H¯εmin(PAE |RE).
Corollary 1 implies the second inequality in (22).
1Technically, RE must be such that supp(PE) ⊂ supp(RE).
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APPENDIX C
PROOF OF SECOND INEQUALITY IN PROPOSITION 4
Given the memory set M with the cardinality M, we randomly choose the encoder F such that
P{F (x) = F (x′)} ≤ 1
M
. (141)
Given a encoder f : X → M, we define decoder gf as follows. Given m ∈ M and y ∈ Y , we decide
gf(m, y) to be an element x ∈ X to satisfy that y ∈ Qx where Qx := {y|PXY (x, y) ≥ 1MPY (y)}. If no
element x ∈ X satisfies this condition, we decide gf(m, y) to be an arbitrary element of X . In this code,
the decoding error probability is upper bounded by∑
x
PX(x)PY |X=xQ
c
x +
∑
x
PX(x)
∑
x′(6=x)∈X|f(x)=f(x′)
PY |X=xQx′ (142)
The average of the second term with respect to the choice of f is evaluated as follows.
PF
∑
x
PX(x)
∑
x′(6=x)∈X|F (x)=F (x′)
PY |X=xQx′
≤
∑
x
PX(x)
∑
x′(6=x)∈X
1
M
PY |X=xQx′ ≤
∑
x
PX(x)
∑
x′∈X
1
M
PY |X=xQx′
=
∑
x′∈X
1
M
PYQx′ =
1
M
PY × I
{
(x, y)
∣∣∣PXY (x, y) ≥ 1
M
PY (y)
}
. (143)
Hence, the average of (142) is upper bounded by
PXY
{
(x, y)
∣∣∣PXY (x, y) < 1
M
PY (y)
}
+
1
M
PY × I
{
(x, y)
∣∣∣PXY (x, y) ≥ 1
M
PY (y)
}
= ∆DT (PXY ‖PY ).
(144)
This evaluation with yields the second inequality of (52).
Remark 5: The paper [27, Theorem 7] derived the upper bound
(1 + c)PXY
{
(x, y)
∣∣∣PXY (x, y) < 1
M
PY (y)
}
+
(c+ 1)2
c
1
M
PY × I
{
(x, y)
∣∣∣PXY (x, y) ≥ 1
M
PY (y)
}
(145)
in their proof in the quantum setting. Since it considers the quantum setting, the coefficients in their
upper bound are (1 + c) and (c+1)
2
c
due to the use of Hayashi-Nagaoka inequality to handles the non-
commutativity. In the commutative setting, we can replace them by 1. Hence, the upper bound (145)
equals the upper bound (144).
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